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The  structure  of compensation  packages  of  Chief  Executive  Ofﬁcers  (CEOs)  has  been  a signiﬁcant  research
interest  for  researchers  across  various  disciplines.  In  this  paper,  we  examine  a  unique  relationship
between  CEO  compensation  and  risk  (systematic  risk)  in  the  US  restaurant  industry.  Our  research  ques-
tion  stems  from  the  assumption  that  CEOs  must  be  rewarded  with  a  higher  incentive-based  compensation
in  high-risk  proﬁle  restaurant  companies  in  order  to  motivate  them  to perform  in  their  full potential  for
mutual beneﬁts  of  the  CEO  and  shareowners.  Furthermore,  we  investigate  whether  ﬁrm  risk  moderates
the relationship  between  ﬁrm  performance  and  CEO  total  compensation  controlling  for  the  ﬁrm  size  and
CEO  ownership.  We  draw  our sample  ﬁrms  from  the US  restaurant  industry.  Findings  of  our  study  suggest
that  ﬁrm  risk  induces  a higher  proportion  of  incentive-based  compensation  for  restaurant  companies’
CEOs,  and  ﬁrm  risk  does  not  seem  to moderate  the  relationship  between  pay  and  performance  in the
restaurant  industry.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A quick review of the past two decades in ﬁnance, accounting,
and management literature reveals that there has been a steady
increase in the number of studies examining the link between
executive compensation and ﬁrm performance (Tosi et al., 2000).
Perhaps one of the reasons for the rapid increase in the quantity
of compensation studies is the economic signiﬁcance of inﬂated
compensation packages on shareowners’ and other stakeholders’
wealth. While the purported relationship between compensation
and performance is still questionable, the average pay-package of
chief executive ofﬁcers (CEO) of US companies has gone up notice-
ably. In a recent article (Wall Street Journal, 2011), it was  reported
that CBS Corporation’s CEO, Les Moonves, received compensation
for 2010 valued at about $57.7 million. This is only one of the exam-
ples that represent the enormous compensation packages offered
to company executives, and yet it is enough to get the attention of
various stakeholders of a company who wonder at the enormity of
the compensation packages.
The growing literature on compensation research has its roots
in the alleged relationship between ﬁrm performance and execu-
tive compensation. CEO’s compensation, outweighing signiﬁcantly
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those of their immediate subordinates as well as those of line
employees, has been the core of the investigation. Knowing that
organizational outcomes are linked to the leadership and manage-
rial talent (Gray and Canella, 1997), it is understandable why the
attention has focused on CEO’s compensation. This is indeed in line
with the normative prescription of agency theory (Gray and Canella,
1997) grounded on the presumption that compensation packages
should be closely tied to organizational outcomes from corporate
performance. This argument in prior research still constitutes a
relevant topic for research and tries to capture the optimal level
of ownership and CEO incentive system (i.e. Florackis et al., 2009;
Jurkus et al., 2011; Wu  and Tu, 2007).
An examination of the previous studies in the compensation
literature shows that ﬁrm size is by far the most signiﬁcant deter-
minant of the CEO compensation level while ﬁrm performance
explains only a small portion of the variation in CEO compen-
sation level (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988; Kroll et al., 1990).
Further evidence shows that strong governance quality, such as
independent boards, accounts for some of the variation in the CEOs’
compensation levels as well (Core et al., 1999; Gomez-Mejia et al.,
1987; Boyd, 1994). Inconclusive and confusingly contradicting ﬁnd-
ings have motivated further research in this particular domain of
corporate governance. However, one area that has garnered less
attention in the compensation literature has been the impact of
ﬁrm risk on the CEO’s compensation structure. Firms with a high-
risk proﬁle tend to encounter higher outcome uncertainty, which
0278-4319/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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reduces executives’ motivations to invest in risky projects. In this
regard, one of the challenges ﬁrms (owners) encounter is to design
compensation packages that are intended to motivate risk-averse
agents to bear higher risk in order to undertake value-increasing
projects (Murphy, 2000). Hence, pay-premium offered to execu-
tives in an effort to increase their risk-taking propensity is one
of the important contractual mechanisms to reduce agency costs
(Shavell, 1979).
In this study, we examine the role of ﬁrm risk on the CEO com-
pensation contracting practices. Speciﬁcally, we  try to understand
whether the structure of the CEOs’ compensation changes as the
level of risk they have to bear increases. Furthermore, we inves-
tigate whether the relationship between pay and performance is
inﬂuenced by ﬁrm risk.
Our study contributes to the previous literature in several ways.
First, we estimate the relationship between ﬁrm risk and compen-
sation along with the pay–performance relationship and focus on
a particular aspect of the compensation-incentive pay. The exact
direction of the pay–performance relationship is not crystal-clear
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990), which leads to a potential endogene-
ity problem between pay and performance (Duru and Iyengar,
1999). If not taken care of, untreated simultaneity between pay
and performance can lead to fallacious regression speciﬁcations
and inefﬁcient parameter estimates. In order to account for the
potential endogeneity we estimate our regression models in a
simultaneous equations modeling framework. Second, we use a
sample of ﬁrms from the US restaurant industry, which is part of
the larger services sector. Several factors encourage us to exam-
ine our research question in this particular industry. Restaurant
business has traditionally been known as a risky business and the
risk varies among the segments of the industry (Kim, 2009). For
instance, De Noble and Olsen (1986) discuss that restaurant indus-
try has the highest market volatility among seven industries they
have tested. Moreover, Huo and Kwansa (1994) documented that
restaurant industry is the riskiest (highest beta) industry group
in a study where they compared the betas of hotel, restaurant
and utility ﬁrms. Moreover, macroeconomic downturns, difﬁcul-
ties in entering long-term ﬁxed-price supply contracts, and the
ease with which consumers can give up away-from-home food
consumption add to the operational challenges of the restaurant
industry (Risk Center, 2009). Earnings and operating margins of
the restaurant companies heavily depend on the availability of
leisure time and disposable income of consumers. Thus, uncertainty
of consumer spending, ﬂuctuating supply and demand quantities,
ambiguities in macro factors such as consumer price index (CPI),
gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP)
all add to the risk in the restaurant industry. Furthermore, restau-
rant ﬁrms face a high likelihood of failure from the point of their
inception. About 30 percent of the restaurants fail in their ﬁrst year
of operations (Parsa et al., 2005). Lastly, using a single industry
provides homogeneous data that avoids contamination of indus-
try speciﬁc factors. High risk proﬁle and substantial failure rates
make the restaurant industry an appealing candidate to inves-
tigate the role of ﬁrm risk in the CEOs’ compensation structure
and to observe how board of directors attempt to align the inter-
ests of CEOs with those of the owners. Furthermore, using only
restaurant ﬁrms provides important insights to restaurant opera-
tors and their BODs to draw direct inferences about the ﬁrm risk
on shaping CEO compensation packages. With all that pointed out,
we attempt to contribute to the compensation contracting litera-
ture by extending the knowledge of the relationship between risk
and compensation. This phenomenon has not been fully under-
stood in the mainstream literature because the sample ﬁrms come
from industries providing mixed ﬁndings. Further, focusing on a
particularly risky industry, the current study attempts to pinpoint
the role of varying ﬁrm risk on the structure of pay-packages of
restaurant CEOs. By doing so, the current study aims at providing
insightful implications to the practitioners of the hospitality indus-
try as well.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we provide evidence from previous research. In Section 3, we
describe our sample, data, and introduce our empirical methods.
Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 presents robustness tests
and Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2. Review of related literature
2.1. Principal-agent theory and pay–performance studies
An optimal level of executive compensation and ﬁrm per-
formance are the inseparable dynamics in a ﬁrm’s strategy. For
instance, an optimal executive pay contract will not only beneﬁt
ﬁrms’ operations but also hedge to exogenous events – e.g. imme-
diate switch in ﬁrm’s stock options policy (Balsam et al., 2011).
Previous research focused on factors that help explain the
variation in CEO compensation and found mixed and inconclu-
sive results. It has been well documented that ﬁrm size, ﬁrm
performance, and corporate governance qualities (including but
not limited to board characteristics and ownership structure) are
important determinants of CEO compensation (Core et al., 1999;
Mehran, 1995).
It has also been shown that boards of directors need to take
some initiative to stabilize the conﬂicting interests of agents and
shareholders (Walsh and Seward, 1990) so as to avoid the subopti-
mal  managerial decisions that are detrimental to the ﬁrm’s value.
One of the ways to alleviate the adverse effect of the unmatched
interests of two parties is to associate executive pay with ﬁrm per-
formance (Canarella and Nourayi, 2008; Murphy, 1985; Glassman
and Rhoades, 1980). Thus, principal-agent theory claims that if the
CEO’s total compensation is tied to his/her performance, it would
induce a positive motivation for CEOs to make value-increasing
decisions and to achieve operational performance benchmarks.
The choice of the performance measure in the literature is quite
mixed. Accounting measures (i.e. return on assets (ROA), return on
equity (ROE), earnings per share (EPS)) and market measures (i.e.
stock returns and Tobin’s Q) are a few that have been used in prior
research.
Most of the studies done in the past two decades were aimed
at ﬁnding the impact of ﬁrm performance either on the aggregate
CEO compensation or on its particular components. Depending on
the distinctiveness of the research question, some studies encom-
passed other economic, governance, and CEO related attributes into
their investigation as well. For instance, Core et al. (1999) exam-
ine the determinants of CEO compensation controlling for several
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors. In their comprehensive study, they not only
look at the inﬂuence of economic factors (ROA and stock return)
on CEO compensation, but further hypothesize that ownership
structure and board composition characteristics are also signiﬁ-
cant contributors to explaining the variation in CEO compensation
level (total compensation, cash compensation, and salary). Their
results demonstrate that stock returns are statistically signiﬁcant
in explaining the variation in total CEO compensation, but ROA is
not. In addition, they ﬁnd that ﬁrm size is positively associated
with total CEO compensation, and ﬁrms with higher investment
opportunities (as proxied by the market-to-book ratio) pay higher
CEO compensation. In support of the ﬁndings of Core et al. (1999),
Madura et al. (1996), and Skalpe (2007) report an insigniﬁcant
association between CEO compensation, and ROE and ROA. Fur-
ther studies, on the other hand, show that accounting measures
are an important indicator of ﬁrm performance. Attaway (2000)
and Veliyath and Bishop (1995) ﬁnd that CEO cash compensation
is positively related to return on equity. Similarly, Cooley (1979)
Author's personal copy
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shows that proﬁtability is positively associated with managerial
pay in small businesses when he draws a sample of ﬁrms from the
petroleum marketers industry. From an international markets per-
spective, Firth et al. (2007) report a positive association between
executive pay and ﬁrm performance (ROA) in China. Among several
industry-level studies, Crumley (2008) examine the determinants
of CEO compensation in the US banking industry and found that
stock return is a signiﬁcant determinant of compensation. Like-
wise, Veliyath and Bishop (1995) examine the pay–performance
relationship in the US drug and pharmaceutical industry and report
a positive relationship between CEO cash compensation and ROA.
2.2. Risk factor in the compensation contracting
Core et al. (1999) examine the impact of a set of corporate
characteristics on the CEO’s cash compensation and ﬁnd that ﬁrm
risk (standard deviation of return on assets and standard devia-
tion of returns) is negatively related to compensation. Likewise,
Bloom and Milkovich (1998) provide a negative link between ﬁrm
risk and CEO’s bonus pay to base salary ratio. When risk is mea-
sured in terms of the standard deviation of stock returns, Garen
(1994) ﬁnds weak evidence for the hypothesis that CEO’s stock-
related compensation is decreasing in the standard deviation of
ﬁrm returns. In the same line, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) doc-
ument that CEO’s pay–performance sensitivity is decreasing in the
variance of their ﬁrms’ stock returns for various compensation com-
ponents. Contrarily, a recent study by Haggard and Haggard (2008)
revealed that CEO’s base salary and total compensation are posi-
tively related to the ﬁrm risk the CEO has to bear. Mehran (1995),
on the other hand, reports that business risk (standard deviation
of the percentage change in the operating income) is not related
at all to the proportion of CEO’s equity-based compensation. As
the previous research shows the ﬁndings are mixed and inconclu-
sive and, therefore, lend themselves to more research in this ﬁeld.
Researchers from other disciplines look into the effect of various
risk proxies on different compensation components. For instance,
Wen  and Chen (2008) investigate the association between total risk,
insurance risk, and idiosyncratic risk and CEO compensation con-
tracts in the property/liability insurance industry and ﬁnd that ﬁrm
risk does not increase the proportion of option-based pay over total
pay in this industry.
There is only a handful of compensation studies conducted
speciﬁcally for the hospitality industry, and ﬁrm risk has not been
the focus of any of these previous studies (Jang and Park, 2011).
Among those studies, Barber et al. (2006) investigate the rela-
tionship between stock price and CEO compensation in the US
restaurant industry. Similarly, Madanoglu and Karadag (2006) look
into the effect of ﬁrm performance on the change of CEO cash com-
pensation (pay–performance sensitivity). In the same vein, Kim and
Gu (2005) examine the determinants of CEO pay in the US restau-
rant industry and report that ﬁrm size is the major determinant
of CEO’s total cash compensation. Dalbor et al. (2010) examine the
restaurant industry and provide evidence of a market performance
effect on the CEO’s total compensation. In a more recent study,
Guillet et al. (2012) examine the executive compensation in the
restaurant industry and report varying results for CEO, senior exec-
utive ofﬁcers and board members. According to their study, ﬁrm
size and tenure appeared to be common determinants of executive
compensation in the restaurant industry.
3. Econometric model of executive compensation and ﬁrm
risk
3.1. Research hypotheses
Compensation arrangements vary in the extent to which exec-
utives bear risk given the compensation they are paid from year
to year. At one extreme, executives with only ﬁxed income bear
no compensation risk. In contrast, executives experiencing perfor-
mance contingent compensation bear large risks with respect to
the level of compensation (Gray and Canella, 1997). Miller et al.
(2002) argue that the degree of ﬁrm risk should assert distinctive
effects on executive compensation risk bearing.
The ﬁrst hypothesis of our study concentrates on the contention
that equity-based compensation is tied to market performance of
the ﬁrm, which requires undertaking riskier projects that are aimed
at maximizing shareholder return. This, in turn, exhibits greater
risk for the ﬁrms and higher uncertainty for the managers to deal
with. The board of directors expects managers to work through the
exposed uncertainty and risk and maintain their motivation to align
their own interests with those of owners. One way of ensuring this
is to use higher equity-based compensation to increase the overall
wealth of managers and keep them motivated toward achieving
ﬁnancial goals of both parties. Based on this argument, we  expect
that as the risk of a company increases, board of directors, on behalf
of owners, will prefer to pay a higher proportion of equity-based
compensation to total compensation to the CEO of the ﬁrm. If it
turns out to be true, then we should be able to observe a positive
coefﬁcient on the risk variable in a regression of incentive-pay (ratio
of equity-based compensation to total compensation) on ﬁrm risk.
H1. The ratio of CEO’s equity-based compensation to total com-
pensation is positively related to ﬁrm risk in the US restaurant
industry.
To further investigate the impact of ﬁrm risk on the overall
structure of CEO compensation, we look into how it affects the
well-known relationship between compensation and performance.
In a traditional compensation package, pay is mainly tied to perfor-
mance and therefore better performing executives are paid higher
compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Mehran, 1995; Veliyath
and Bishop, 1995). Combined with the riskiness proposition, pos-
itive effect of performance on the CEO compensation level could
be further enhanced. Given that pay is positively affected by per-
formance, increased riskiness can infer a higher compensation
package for CEOs in the restaurant industry. In fact, this could be
intuitively expected because achieving a unit increase in the com-
pany performance would be more challenging for a risky company
than a less risky company. Therefore, the return for the CEO, which
shows up in higher total compensation, should be more appealing
so as to keep them motivated and rewarded. Henceforth, we expect
that ﬁrm risk may  moderate the relationship between pay and per-
formance, and board of directors allocate a higher compensation
for a riskier business than a less risky business for the same unit of
increase in the company performance. We  expect this relationship
to hold even within an industry. With that argument, we formu-
late Hypotheses 2a and 2b for accounting performance and market
performance measures.
H2a. Riskier ﬁrms pay a higher compensation to their CEOs for a
unit increase in the accounting performance of the company, ceteris
paribus.
H2b. Riskier ﬁrms pay a higher compensation to their CEOs for
a unit increase in the market performance of the company, ceteris
paribus.
3.2. Variables
Beta, as a measure of systematic risk, is the only security-speciﬁc
parameter that affects the equilibrium return on a risky security
(Mandelker and Rhee, 2009). We  use market-driven risk in this
study and utilize Carhart’s four-factor model composed of beta (ˇ),
size factor (SMB), book-to-market factor (HML) (Fama and French,
1992), and momentum factor (UMD). The beta coefﬁcient provides
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a clear and quantiﬁable measure of risk and is the most robust risk
proxy in assessing an assets’ risk class (Fama and French, 1993).
Kothari et al. (1995) suggest that the value-weighted stock index is
preferred as a market proxy over the equally weighted index. Thus,
S&P 500 is utilized as a benchmark because the components of the
index are weighted according to the total market value of their
outstanding shares in our beta (ˇ) estimation for the ﬁrms consid-
ered in our sample. Also, 30-day T-bill rate is taken as a proxy for
risk-free rate in this computation.
We deﬁne compensation in two ways. First, we  deﬁne a proxy
for incentive compensation. It is operationalized as the ratio of
equity-based compensation to total compensation. Equity-based
compensation is operationalized as the sum of stock options and
stock awards (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009). Stock options are
Black and Scholes values and stock awards are valued at the grant
date fair value. Second, we deﬁne total compensation as the sum of
salary, bonus, stock awards, stock options, and all other long-term
pay components. Consistent with prior research in the compensa-
tion literature, we account for the effect of ﬁrm performance and
ﬁrm size as well (Attaway, 2000; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). To
control for the performance effect on compensation, we  use both
an accounting measure and a market measure in our models. In line
with previous studies we use return on assets and stock return as
the performance proxies. We  include ﬁrm size variable to control
for the possible effect that larger the ﬁrm, larger the compensation
level (Ke et al., 1999; Anderson et al., 2000).
In addition to the ﬁrm speciﬁc determinants of CEO compensa-
tion, we also account for the CEO’s age and CEO’s previous stock
ownership. There are two competing views regarding the effect of
CEO’s age on his/her compensation. The ﬁrst view suggests that
as a CEO gets older, his/her horizon with the company diminishes
and, therefore, CEOs pursue less risk-inducing projects, which then
may  result in an incentive for board of directors to keep CEO com-
pensation ﬁxated at a certain level. This would show up in a form
of reduced compensation packages for retiring or near retiring age
executives. Opposed to this view, a competing view suggests that
CEO’s age implies tenure, and tenure must be rewarded with a pre-
mium (Conyon et al., 2001). Given these opposing views about CEO
age, we avoid making any prediction about the sign of this variable
but include it to control for the human capital effect on compensa-
tion. With regards to CEO ownership, Khan et al. (2005) argue that
as CEO’s ownership increases, there will be less need for monitor-
ing on CEOs because ownership helps to align owner’s and agents
incentives. Therefore, we believe that CEOs would strive to perform
their best to keep the ﬁrm performance at maximum and increase
their stake in the ﬁrm. Hence, we also control for this ownership
effect in our econometric model.
3.3. Sample and data
We  collect our data from three sources. Compensation data
comes from the Compustat’s ExecuComp database for years
1992–2009. Company ﬁnancials are from Compustat annual ﬁlings,
and stock returns are calculated from the stock prices obtained from
monthly stock ﬁles in CRSP. For our risk variable (beta) estima-
tion, our sample ﬁrms must match the following criteria: (a) have
adjusted month-end closing stock prices including capital changes
(i.e. stock and cash dividends), and (b) have Compustat data for
accounting information. For compensation constructs, we obtained
all compensation data from ExecuComp database for SIC code 5812
(Eating Places). The ﬁnal sample included 47 restaurant compa-
nies publicly traded over the period of 1992–2009. We  retrieve
compensation data from ExecuComp database for 544 CEO ﬁrm
year observations. These data include CEO’s annual salary, bonus
and total equity-based compensation. We  collect sample ﬁrms’
ﬁnancial data from Compustat and CRSP for the observation years
of 1992–2009. Further, two databases are merged resulting in a
reduced sample size of 240 complete ﬁrm year observations. The
major source of decline in the sample size is the lack of equity-based
compensation data (249 cases). Additional reduction in the sample
size is caused by 28 missing observations for growth variable, 17
missing observations for CEO’s previous stock ownership variable,
9 missing observations for age variable and 1 missing observation
for cash compensation variable.
3.4. Empirical methodology
If the managers view the increased ﬁrm risk as a potential
threat for their future wealth they might be less inclined to take on
projects that add to the level of riskiness of a company. In return,
bypassing risky projects may  reduce the earnings and return poten-
tial of a company because risky projects have a higher potential
for incremental returns. Taking into account the executives’ con-
cerns about their future compensation and return prospects of a
company, board of directors need to set compensation schemes
that will effectively meet executives’ concerns and owners’ return
prospects. In this study, we  propose that board of directors achieve
a balance by allocating a higher proportion of equity-based com-
pensation to their CEOs as the level of ﬁrm risk CEOs face increases.
By doing so, board of directors ensure that CEOs are induced to take
on value-increasing risky projects that is in the best interest of own-
ers, and at the same time they are promised to be awarded by the
potential future returns of these value-increasing projects. To test
for this incentive hypothesis (H1), we  estimate the following sys-
tems of equations. We  opt to test our hypothesis in a simultaneous
equation modeling framework mainly because of the endogeneity
concerns between the performance and compensation variables.
Inc Comp = ˇ0 + ˇ1 Roat + ˇ2 Returnt + ˇ3 Riskt + ˇ4 lnSalest
+ ˇ5 Aget + ˇ6 CeoOwnt−1 + ε (1)
Roat = 0 + 1 lnCashCompt + 2 lnSalest + 3 Leveraget
+ 4 Growtht + 5 CeoOwnt−1 + ε (2)
Returnt = ˛0 + ˛1 lnEquityCompt + ˛2 lnSalest + ˛3 Leveraget
+ ˛4 Growtht + ˛5 CeoOwnt−1 + ε (3)
Inc Comp: The ratio of equity-based compensation to total com-
pensation. Equity-based compensation is operationalized as the
sum of stock options and stock awards. Total compensation is the
sum of equity-based compensation and cash compensation (salary
plus bonus).
Roa: Return on assets, operationalized as net income at the end of
year t divided by total assets at the end of year t.
Return: Stock return, operationalized as the closing stock price in
year t minus the closing stock price in year t − 1, divided by the
closing stock price in year t − 1.
Risk: Systematic risk, beta coefﬁcient Carhart’s four-factor model.
lnSales: Natural logarithm of total sales.
Age: CEO’s age at each ﬁscal year end.
CeoOwnt−1: CEO initial stock holdings as of the end of last year’s
ﬁscal year end.
lnCashComp: Natural logarithm of CEO’s cash compensation
including salary and bonus.
Leverage: Ratio of long-term debt to total assets.
Growth: Sales growth rate deﬁned as the current year’s total sales
minus last year’s total sales divided by the last year’s total sales.
lnEquityComp: Natural logarithm of CEO equity compensation
deﬁned as the sum of stock options and stock awards.
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In accordance with our discussion above, we expect that as
the level of risk increases, proportion of equity-pay to total-pay
increases. Therefore, we expect a positive coefﬁcient on the risk
variable in compensation model (Eq. (1)). Furthermore, consistent
with prior research (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Attaway, 2000), we
anticipate positive coefﬁcients on the performance measures, Roa
and Return,  in the compensation model (Eq. (1)). Size was consis-
tently found to be a strong predictor of executive compensation
(Core et al., 1999). Therefore, we also expect a positive sign for size
variable, which is log of sales, lnSales.  In addition to performance
and size variables, we also control for CEO age and CEO owner-
ship, and expect a positive sign for ownership. We  avoid making a
prediction for the direction of the age variables for the reasons we
discussed in the hypotheses section.
We estimate our systems of equations via three-stage least
squares (3-sls). An ordinary least square (OLS) analysis in our set-
ting would jeopardize the unbiasedness of parameter estimates.
Wen  and Chen (2008) and Iyengar and Zampelli (2008) show that
performance and compensation are endogenous and need to be
jointly estimated. Otherwise, the parameters from the compen-
sation equation would produce unreliable parameter estimates.
Keeping with Wen  and Chen (2008) and Iyengar and Zampelli
(2008), we attempt to control for endogeneity between ﬁrm per-
formance and compensation in our regression models. Both Wen
and Chen (2008), and Iyengar and Zampelli (2008) use 2-sls regres-
sion as their estimation method. However, an estimation method
that accounts for the correlations among the errors terms from each
equation of a system of equations would be more appropriate. As
Eqs. (1)–(3) depict, we have a series of equations, and endogenous
variables from Eqs. (2) and (3) are used as explanatory variables
in Eq. (1). Therefore, it is appropriate to estimate our system of
equations via 3-sls. 3-sls is a mixed estimation method of 2-sls
and SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) and alleviates the endo-
geneity problem among endogenous variables allowing for the use
of endogenous variables as exogenous variables in at least one of
the other equations within the system of equations.1 Besides, 3-sls
is asymptotically more efﬁcient than 2-sls. Its asymptotic efﬁciency
arises from exploiting nonzero cross-equation covariation (Belsley,
1988). Whereas the 2-sls assumes that cross-equation covariation
is zero in a system of equations, the 3-sls uses the estimated cross-
equation covariation in the estimation process.
3.4.1. Roa equation
Canarella and Nourayi (2008) mention that accounting-based
measures are less relevant from the shareholders’ perspective
mainly because they are ex-post and historical measures of ﬁrm
performance. In addition to this drawback, accounting-based mea-
sures are usually related to ﬁxed cash component of compensation
(Mehran, 1995). This is largely due to the risk-averseness of
the managers. That being said, executives offered generous cash
compensation (ﬁxed-component) must be motivated to boost
accounting-based performance in order to increase their potential
ﬁxed compensation in future periods. We,  therefore, specify model
2, which predicts that Roa is related to CEO’s cash compensation
(ﬁxed component).
3.4.2. Return equation
Previous research has shown that investors view stock returns
as a more signiﬁcant input to judge the performance of a ﬁrm
(Canarella and Nourayi, 2008). They claim that market-based mea-
1 SUR would have been an appropriate estimation method however, it does
not  allow for the use of endogenous regressors as exogenous variables in other
equations. However, we  have endogenous regressors that are used as exogenous
regressors in at least one of the other equations within the system of equations.
Table 1
Summary statistics of  ˇ and Carhart’s four-factor model coefﬁcients (ˇ, SMB, HML,
UMD) between the years 1992 and 2009.
Panel A
 ˇ coefﬁcient intervals # of ﬁrms %
<0.5 2 0.04
0.5–1.00 11 0.23
1.00–1.50 7 0.15
1.50–2.00 18 0.38
2.00–2.50 4 0.09
2.50–3.00 3 0.06
>3.00 2 0.04
Firms total 47
Panel B
 ˇ SMB  HML  UMD
Overall arithmetic average 1.62 0.56 0.73 0.28
Median 1.29 0.21 0.38 0.16
Minimum 0.20 −0.26 0.10 −0.19
Maximum 4.41 0.44 0.93 0.41
Spread 4.21 0.70 0.83 0.60
Out of total ﬁrms (48), NPC International, Inc. is excluded from our beta estima-
tions  because NPC went private and was sold to Merrill-Lynch Global Private Equity
Group. The reason we  applied arithmetic average rather than geometric average for
overall average is simply because each coefﬁcient is independent of each other and
each coefﬁcient carries absolute values.
sures are ex ante forward-looking measures of performance and
therefore, these measures are supposed to mitigate the agency
problem between owners and managers. This can be accomplished
by the compensation packages that are related to the stock perfor-
mance of the ﬁrms. Under these circumstances, CEOs with large
equity-based compensation should strive to increase the stock
performance of their ﬁrms in order to raise their own wealth. Even-
tually, increased stock return entails mutual beneﬁts for owners
and managers. In line with this argument, several studies have
shown that market-based performance measures are related to
executive compensation (Murphy, 1985; Coughlan and Schmidt,
1985). Therefore, we  form Eq. (3) such that stock return is expected
to be related to equity-based compensation.
Mehran (1995) ﬁnds that CEO’s stock ownership (percentage of
shares held by the CEO) is positively related to ﬁrm performance
(measured as ROA and Tobin’s Q). Hence, we  also control for the
CEO’s previous stock ownership in our performance equations in
accord with the ﬁnding of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that man-
agers’ incentives to work harder and boost performance increase as
their ownership in the ﬁrm rises. Finally, we  include leverage and
growth in our performance equations in line with Mehran (1995)
and Switzer and Tang (2009).
3.4.3. Computation of ﬁrm risk (systematic risk)
We derive our risk variable (ˇ) by estimating the following four-
factor model (Carhart, 1997):
Rit − Rf = ˇi(Rmt − Rf ) + siSMBt + hi HMLt + UMDt + ˛i
In Carhart’s four-factor model, Rit − Rf is explained by (i) the
excess return on a market portfolio Rmt − Rf, (ii) the difference
between the return on a portfolio of stocks with a high book-value-
to-price ratio (value stocks) and the return on a portfolio of growth
stocks (SMB, small minus big); and (iii) the difference between
the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the
return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks (HML, high
minus low). The last component in this model is the momentum
factor (UMD). This factor represents the monthly return differences
between the high and low prior return portfolios to enclose cross-
sectional return performance (Carhart, 1997).
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Table 2
Correlations between four factors in Carhart model.
Panel A: correlations
Rit − Rf Rmt SMBt HMLt UMDt
Rit − Rf 1 – – – –
Rmt 0.589* 1 – – –
SMBt 0.443* 0.485* 1 – –
HMLt 0.331* 0.219* 0.012 1 –
UMDt 0.183 0.336 0.441* 0.289* 1
Panel  B: summary of estimated Fama/French three-factor betas
Intercept 0.06*
Mkt − Rf 0.499*
SMB  0.146*
HML  0.235*
UMD  0.332*
R2 0.603*
* Correlation is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level (P < 0.05).
Hypotheses 2a and 2b explore the moderating effect of ﬁrm risk
on the relationship between ﬁrm performance and CEO compensa-
tion. In an environment where ﬁrm risk causes a greater uncertainty
for company outcomes as well as for CEO’s overall wealth, the board
of directors may  be inclined to award a pay premium on CEO com-
pensation for any increase in ﬁrm performance. Statistically, this
suggests an interaction between ﬁrm performance and risk. Con-
sequently, we expect that high risk improves the magnitude of the
pay–performance relationship. Eq. (4) tests Hypotheses 2a and 2b.
If these expectations hold true, the coefﬁcients on both interaction
terms in Eq. (4) should yield positive signs.
lnCompt = ˇ0 + ˇ1 Roat + ˇ2 Returnt + ˇ3 Riskt + ˇ4 lnSalest
+ ˇ5 Aget + ˇ6 CeoOwnt−1 + ˇ7 Roat ∗ Riskt
+ ˇ8 Returnt ∗ Riskt + ε (4)
lnComp is the natural logarithm of total compensation, includ-
ing salary, bonus, stock options, stock awards, and all other types
of long-term payments. Roa*Risk is the interaction term, which is
the product of Roa and the Risk variables. Likewise, Return*Risk is
the other interaction term that is the product of Return and Risk
variables. All other variables are as previously deﬁned. To account
for a potential multicollinearity problem, we mean-center Roa,
Return and Risk variables that constitute the interaction terms
(Aiken and West, 1991). We  estimate this model along with Eqs.
(2) and (3) in a system of equations via 3-sls for the previously
discussed endogeneity concerns among the compensation and per-
formance variables.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Beta coefﬁcients of stocks in our sample are summarized in
Table 1 below. The average beta coefﬁcient is 1.62 for the restaurant
companies included in our analyses. The minimum beta coefﬁcient
is found to be 0.20, whereas the maximum is 4.41. The low beta
coefﬁcient does not necessarily imply that that asset has a low level
of risk, but rather it is an indication that its systematic risk compo-
nent is low. The majority of the ﬁrms in our portfolio (18 out of 47
ﬁrms, 38 percent) fall between 1.50 and 2.00 systematic risk class.
The grounds for the discursive correlation with market returns
may  be that stock(s) (i.e. Ruby Tuesday, Inc. in our sample) may
have high fractions of leveraged assets and/or deviant behaviors
in co-movement in prices. Hence, we see a large spread (4.21)
between maximum and minimum beta values.2
Table 2 reports two  panels, which are correlations between
Carhart four-factor and the summary statistics of the coefﬁcients
for US restaurant industry portfolio. The correlations between SMB
and HML  variables with the market return are positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant as well as with value weighted industrial stocks
(Rit − Rf) in our sample. However, the correlation between SMB  and
HML  is very weak and very close to zero. UMD  and SMB  correlations
are found to be higher than the ones with the other factors in the
model. With the high R2 in the model, it represents a good ﬁt among
Carhart’s four-factors.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for all the variables used
in the analyses. For ease of economic interpretation, we report the
actual dollar values of CEO total compensation (TotalComp) in addi-
tion to its log transformation used in our regression models. In our
sample, average CEO total compensation is about $3.5M. Equity
compensation, on average, comprises 44 percent of the total CEO
compensation for the ﬁrms included in our sample. Average return
on assets (Roa) is 7 percent, whereas average stock return (Return) is
24 percent. Average ﬁrm risk for the restaurant companies included
in our sample is 1.6 (risk). Mean leverage ratio is 0.22, and mean
growth rate is 0.12. CEO age, on average, turns out to be 55 within a
range of 38–73; and CEOs, on average, hold 33 percent of the total
common shares outstanding in their ﬁrms.
Table 4 presents Pearson correlation coefﬁcients among our
regression variables. As expected, CEO total compensation (lnTo-
talComp) is positively correlated with both return on assets and
stock return (correlation coefﬁcients 0.2217 and 0.1525, respec-
tively), which suggests that better performing ﬁrms tend to pay
a higher total compensation to their CEOs. We do not observe
the same correlation between performance measures and incen-
tive compensation. The correlation between Inc Comp and Roa and
Return are both insigniﬁcant. Moreover, CEO total compensation
(lnTotalComp) seems to be negatively correlated with the ﬁrm risk
producing a signiﬁcant correlation coefﬁcient of −0.21. Firm size
(lnSales) also appears to be positively correlated with CEO total
compensation – that is to indicate that larger ﬁrms reward their
CEOs with a more generous compensation packages. CEO age is sig-
niﬁcantly and positively correlated with the total compensation,
providing information that experience is awarded with a higher
pay. Moreover, CEO’s previous ownership in the company seems to
2 We winsorize the beta coefﬁcients at 5 percent in regression estimations so as
to  reduce the large variance in the ﬁrm risk proxy.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min  Max
lnTotalComp 240 7.7 0.96 5.80 10.67
TotalComp 240 3.536 4.335 0.329 43.076
lnCashComp 240 6.66 1.70 −6.91 9.15
lnEquityComp 240 6.70 1.43 2.51 10.25
Inc  Comp 240 0.44 0.22 0.02 0.99
Roa  240 0.07 0.09 −0.75 0.61
Return 240 0.24 1.71 −0.80 23.75
Risk  240 1.62 0.96 0.20 4.41
lnSales 240 6.76 1.14 4.29 9.75
Age  240 55 6.90 38 73
CeoOwnt−1 240 32.89 70.65 0.00 62.14
Leverage 240 0.22 0.21 0.00 1.32
Growth 240 0.12 0.17 −0.90 1.21
Descriptive statistics are obtained based on the observations used in Eqs. (1)–(4).
TotalComp is the sum of salary, bonus, stock awards, stock options, and all other long-
term pay components (tdc 1 in Compustat and is denoted in millions). lnCashComp is
deﬁned as the natural logarithm of sum of salary and bonus components. lnEquity-
Comp is the natural logarithm of sum of stock options (Black and Scholes values)
and restricted stock awards (grant date fair value). Inc Comp is the ratio of Equity-
Comp to TotalComp. Roa is the return on assets and computed as net income/total
assets. Return is the annual stock return calculated as the current ﬁscal year end
closing stock price minus previous year’s closing stock price divided by the previ-
ous year’s closing stock price. Risk is our measure of ﬁrm risk and is calculated using
3-factor Fama–French model for each ﬁrm and for each year of observation. lnSales
is  the natural logarithm of sales and proxied for ﬁrm size. Age represents CEO age
at  current year end. CeoOwnt−1 is the CEO common stock ownership and calculated
as  the number of stocks held divided by total common shares outstanding. Lever-
age  is deﬁned as total long-term debt over total assets and growth is the difference
between current year total sales and previous year’s sales divided by previous year’s
sales.
be not correlated with either his/her total compensation or incen-
tive compensation.
4.2. Empirical results
First hypothesis of the study predicts that as systematic risk of
a company increases, it induces an adjustment in the CEO compen-
sation. Executives facing high systematic risk for his/her ﬁrm are
likely to stay away from risky/value increasing decisions that will
consequently jeopardize their compensation. Thus, for a business
where high systematic risk is of concern, board of directors need to
tie CEO’s compensation more strictly to pay components that are
also likely to increase ﬁrm value. With that argument, we would
expect that increased ﬁrm risk induces higher use of equity-based
compensation over total compensation.
Table 5 reports the ﬁndings of 3-sls estimation of the system
of equations including Eqs. (1)–(3). Panel C in Table 5 exhibits the
results of the compensation model. All the variables included in
the compensation equation are found to be signiﬁcantly affecting
proportion of incentive pay paid to restaurant ﬁrms’ CEOs. Two
traditional performance measures, Roa and Return,  are highly sig-
niﬁcant at the 5 percent level and they have positive coefﬁcients
meaning that higher ﬁrm performance leads to greater incentive
pay. The positive association between performance and level of
incentive pay is consistent with the ﬁndings of previous studies
that documented linearly positive relationship between perfor-
mance and CEO pay (Madura et al., 1996; Skalpe, 2007; Veliyath
and Bishop, 1995). Further, ﬁrm size is positively related to pro-
portion of incentive pay of CEOs’ compensation in the restaurant
industry. This ﬁnding is consistent with that of Core et al. (1999)
study that reported larger ﬁrms paying higher total compensation
to their CEOs. The positive coefﬁcient on the ﬁrm size variable in
the current study further suggests that larger ﬁrms prefer to pay
higher proportion of incentive pay. CEO’s previous stock ownership
is also related to proportion of incentive pay. CEO’s age is found to
be negatively related to proportion of incentive pay. This ﬁnding is Ta
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Table 5
Results of 3-sls estimation for incentive compensation hypothesis. The results of 3-sls estimation of systems of equations consisting of Eqs. (1)–(3). The hypothesized
relationship between incentive compensation and ﬁrm risk tested via incentive compensation equation located in the third panel (qIncComp) of this table.
Equation Obs RMSE R2 2 P
qRoa 240 0.0822762 0.1412 49.32 0.0001
qReturn 240 1.643241 0.0687 33.66 0.0139
qlnComp inc 240 0.3074003 −0.983 57.86 0.0000
Variables Coefﬁcient Std. error z P > z
qRoa
lnCashComp −0.0004 0.0029 −0.12 0.901
lnSales 0.0150 0.0051 2.96 0.003
Leverage −0.1346 0.0269 −5.01 0.000
Growth 0.0093 0.0318 0.29 0.770
CeoOwn(t−1)  0.0001 0.0001 1.2 0.231
Intercept 0.0073 0.0663 0.11 0.912
qReturn
lnEquityComp 0.3450 0.0859 4.02 0.000
lnSales −0.2248 0.1179 −1.91 0.057
Leverage 1.1012 0.5389 2.04 0.041
Growth −0.3498 0.6584 −0.53 0.595
CeoOwn(t−1) −0.0020 0.0016 −1.23 0.217
Intercept −0.4182 1.3057 −0.32 0.749
qInc  Comp
Roa 1.5270 0.4764 3.21 0.001
Return 0.0804 0.0355 2.26 0.024
Risk  0.0378 0.0180 2.1 0.036
lnSales 0.0562 0.0157 3.58 0.000
Age  −0.0061 0.0019 −3.17 0.002
CeoOwn(t−1)  0.0004 0.0002 1.97 0.049
Intercept 0.0527 0.2279 0.23 0.817
Endogenous variables: Roa Return, Inc Comp
Exogenous variables: lnCashComp, lnSales,  Leverage, Growth, CeoOwn(t−1)
1994.fyear 1995.fyear 1996.fyear 1997.fyear 1998.fyear 1999.fyear
2000.fyear 2001.fyear 2002.fyear 2003.fyear 2004.fyear 2005.fyear
2006.fyear lnEquityComp risk age
Inc Comp is the ratio of equity-based compensation to total compensation. Roa is return on assets (net income divided by total assets) and Return is the annual stock return
(difference between current year’s closing stock price and previous year’s closing stock price, divided by the previous year’s closing stock price). Risk is our measure of ﬁrm
risk  and derived by obtaining betas from 3-factor Fama–French model using 30-day T-bill rates for risk-free rate of return. In order to reduce error variance in ﬁrm betas,
betas  are winsorized at 5 percent. lnSales is the natural logarithm of sales. Age represents CEO age at current year end. CeoOwn(t−1) is the CEO common stock ownership in
the  previous year end and calculated as the number of stocks held divided by total common shares outstanding in year t − 1.
intriguing and might have one explanation. For younger CEOs who
are early in their careers in top executive positions, incentive pay
may  be seen as a signiﬁcant motivational tool to induce them to
take on risky but proﬁtable projects. The main independent vari-
able, ﬁrm risk, is signiﬁcant at the conventional 5 percent level and
has a coefﬁcient 0.0378. This translates to 0.0378 point increase in
the proportion incentive pay for a one point increase in the ﬁrm
beta. Despite the small magnitude of the coefﬁcient, it is indicative
that as the riskiness (measured in beta) of a restaurant company
increases, board of directors raise the proportion of incentive pay
in the CEOs’ total compensation. With this result, Hypothesis 1 is
conﬁrmed.
We test Hypotheses 2a and 2b in a similar fashion by using
another system of equations including Eqs. (2)–(4). The new system
of equation has a total compensation equation, not present in our
tests of Hypothesis 1. Our intention is to show that the relationship
between compensation and ﬁrm performance is more profound
when the level of ﬁrms risk is higher for a company. In an ideal
situation ﬁrms reward their executives for increased ﬁrm perfor-
mance (Yoshikawa et al., 2010). Our proposition is that this reward,
expressed in the form of higher total compensation, will be higher
for riskier ﬁrms. We  test this proposition with both accounting
performance (Roa) and market performance (Return). Positive coef-
ﬁcients on the interaction terms between performance measures
and ﬁrm risk will conﬁrm Hypotheses 2a and 2b, leading to con-
clusion that when the ﬁrms are riskier, CEOs’ pay level tends to be
affected at a greater extent from a unit increase in the company’s
performance.
The main effects of Roa and Return are strongly signiﬁcant in
the compensation equation (Panel C in Table 6). This ﬁnding is
conﬁrmative to previous research showing a positive association
between pay and performance (Veliyath and Bishop, 1995; Barber
et al., 2006; Dalbor et al., 2010). The ﬁrm risk variable (Risk) has
a positive coefﬁcient (0.1634) implying a greater total compensa-
tion for the CEO as the level of ﬁrm risk increases for a restaurant
company. This ﬁnding is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent signiﬁcance
level (P = 0.027). Statistically signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient on the
risk variable is consistent with the ﬁndings of Hypothesis 1. Taken
together, it could be said that riskiness of a restaurant ﬁrm increases
both CEO’s total compensation and proportion of incentive pay in
his/her total compensation. Roa*Risk interaction term is found to
be signiﬁcant; however the direction of the relationship is contrary
to our proposition. The negative coefﬁcient (−2.5605) can be inter-
preted as a decline in the total compensation of the CEO as the
ﬁrm performs better for riskier ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is in complete
opposition to our managerial proposition that riskier restaurant
ﬁrms ﬁnd it more optimal to reward their CEOs generously for
increased ﬁrm performance. On the other hand, Return*Risk interac-
tion is not signiﬁcant, leading us to reject Hypothesis 2b. Opposite
direction of the coefﬁcient on Roa*Risk interaction and insigniﬁ-
cant coefﬁcient on Return*Risk interaction terms provide us with
the conclusion that ﬁrm risk does not play a moderating role in
the relationship between ﬁrm performance and CEO total pay in
the US restaurant industry. This ﬁnding can imply one of following
two  cases: either the boards of directors of US  restaurant com-
panies do not factor ﬁrm risk into the pay–performance structure
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Table 6
Results of 3-sls estimation for moderating effect of ﬁrm risk. The results of 3-sls estimation of roa, return and total compensation equations. Panel 3 of the table shows the
results  of total compensation equation, where we  test the moderating effect of ﬁrm risk on the compensation and performance relationship.
Equation Obs RMSE R2 2 P
qRoa 240 0.0813 0.1617 47.00 0.0002
qReturn 240 1.6908 0.0140 106.92 0.0000
qComp Int 240 2.0237 −3.4452 147.91 0.0000
Variables Coefﬁcient Std. error z P > z
qRoa
lnCashComp 0.0054 0.0031 1.76 0.078
lnSales 0.0131 0.0051 2.59 0.010
Leverage −0.1201 0.0269 −4.46 0.000
Growth −0.0113 0.0313 −0.36 0.719
CeoOwn(t−1)  0.0001 0.0001 1.47 0.141
Intercept −0.0832 0.0664 −1.25 0.210
qReturn
lnEquityComp 0.4251 0.0621 6.84 0.000
lnSales −0.3031 0.1094 −2.77 0.006
Leverage 1.5899 0.5267 3.02 0.003
Growth 0.7480 0.5072 1.47 0.140
CeoOwn(t−1) −0.0028 0.0016 −1.73 0.084
Intercept −0.6814 1.3052 −0.52 0.602
qlnTotComp
Roa  8.9376 2.2245 4.02 0.000
Return 1.0309 0.1880 5.48 0.000
Roa*Risk  −2.5605 0.8871 −2.89 0.004
Return*Risk  0.3140 0.1874 1.67 0.094
Risk  0.1634 0.0738 2.21 0.027
lnSales 0.4907 0.0884 5.55 0.000
Age  0.0086 0.0066 1.32 0.187
CeoOwn(t−1)  0.0038 0.0014 2.79 0.005
Intercept 2.9038 1.1823 2.46 0.014
Endogenous variables: Roa, Return,  lnTotComp
Exogenous variables: lnCashComp, lnSales, Leverage, Growth, CeoOwn(t−1)
1994.fyear 1995.fyear 1996.fyear 1997.fyear 1998.fyear 1999.fyear 2000.fyear 2001.fyear 2002.fyear
2003.fyear 2004.fyear 2005.fyear 2006.fyear lnEquityComp,  Roa*Risk, Return*Risk risk age
lnTotComp is the sum of cash compensation and equity-based compensation. Roa is return on assets (net income divided by total assets) and Return is the annual stock return
(difference between current year’s closing stock price and previous year’s closing stock price, divided by the previous year’s closing stock price). Risk is our measure of ﬁrm
risk  and derived by obtaining betas from 3-factor Fama–French model using 30-day T-bill rates for risk-free rate of return. In order to reduce error variance in ﬁrm betas,
betas  are winsorized at 5 percent. Roa*Risk is the interaction term between roa and risk and Return*Risk is the interaction term between stock return and risk. Roa,  Return and
Risk  variables are mean centered (Aiken and West, 1991) to alleviate the multicollinearity. lnSales is the natural logarithm of sales. Age represents CEO age at current year
end.  CeoOwn(t−1) is the CEO common stock ownership in the previous year end and calculated as the number of stocks held divided by total common shares outstanding in
year  t−1.
of their executives, or they do that, but this mechanism does not
work well in the restaurant industry. With regards to accounting
performance, negative coefﬁcient on the interaction term Roa*Risk
does not comply with the traditional practice of rewarding execu-
tives for improved ﬁrm performance. It has been previously shown
that restaurant ﬁrms reward their executives for increased ﬁrm
performance (Madanoglu and Karadag, 2006; Guillet et al., 2012).
Punishing executives for improved ﬁrm performance in a riskier
restaurant ﬁrm could basically be viewed as an anomaly unless
the board of directors views the riskiness of a restaurant ﬁrm as
totally irrelevant to its performance. This is what we observe in the
market return performance measure. The insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient
on Return*Risk variable basically implies that board of directors
of restaurant companies do not view ﬁrm risk as a relevant fac-
tor in determining CEO pay based on his/her ability to produce
higher return for shareholders. One of the reasons for ignoring riski-
ness in determining pay–performance schemes might be that board
of directors might concede that restaurant ﬁrms are inherently
risky and the future is relatively unpredictable. Therefore, setting a
pay–performance scheme accounting for ﬁrm risk in the restaurant
industry might be viewed as not cost–effective and impractical.
5. Robustness tests
Panel A of Table 7 reports the ﬁndings of CEO total compen-
sation (cash compensation and equity compensation) on ﬁrm risk,
performance measures, and other control variables excluding inter-
action terms. Our main analysis supports the proposition that as
the riskiness of a restaurant company increases, its CEO will earn
a higher proportion of equity-based compensation. Furthermore,
the signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient on the risk variable (Risk) from
the robustness tests suggests that CEOs’ total compensation is pos-
itively related to the level of ﬁrm risk in the absence of interaction
terms. This particular ﬁnding implies that board of directors take
into account the level of ﬁrm risk a CEO has to bear in running a
restaurant ﬁrm, and adjusts both the level and the structure of the
compensation packages accordingly. Furthermore, both accounting
measure (Roa) and market measure (Return) of performance are sig-
niﬁcant and positive suggesting that compensation is an increasing
function of ﬁrm performance. Firm size (lnSales) and CEO owner-
ship are also signiﬁcant determinants of CEO total compensation in
the absence of interaction terms.
In panel B of Table 7, we  use an alternative risk measure for
ﬁrm risk. We  use total risk as the main independent variable of our
analysis and estimate Eqs. (1)–(3) via 3-sls in a similar fashion to
Hypothesis 1. Despite the positive sign of the total risk variable, it
is insigniﬁcant, opposite to our hypothesis that increasing ﬁrm risk
raises the proportion of equity-based pay of the CEOs. This ﬁnding is
inconsistent with the original risk measure beta that we use in our
main analyses and implies that it is the systematic risk that mat-
ters in compensation contracting not the total risk that the ﬁrm is
facing.
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Table 7
Robustness tests.
Panel A: total compensation excluding interaction terms
Equation Obs RMSE R2 2 P
qRoa 240 0.081519 0.1569 48.67 0.0001
qReturn 240 1.698152 0.0054 128.05 0.0000
qlnTotComp 240 2.203752 -4.2713 111.96 0.0000
Variables Coefﬁcient Std. error z P > z
qlnTotComp
Roa 9.3261 2.6134 3.57 0.000
Return 1.1001 0.1988 5.53 0.000
Risk  0.1508 0.0700 2.15 0.031
lnSales 0.4354 0.0902 4.83 0.000
Age 0.0158 0.0063 2.51 0.012
CeoOwn(t−1) 0.0034 0.0014 2.46 0.014
Panel B: total risk as a measure of ﬁrm risk to test for Hypothesis 1
Equation Obs RMSE R2 2 P
qRoa 240 0.0820473 0.1459 49.66 0.0001
qReturn 240 1.636413 0.0764 31.1 0.0281
qComp inc 240 0.2895792 −0.7597 56.05 0.0000
Variables Coefﬁcient Std. error z P > z
qInc Comp
Roa 1.3657 0.4711 2.9 0.004
Return 0.0696 0.0353 1.97 0.049
Risk  0.0172 0.0130 1.32 0.187
lnSales 0.0528 0.0157 3.36 0.001
Age  −0.0064 0.0019 −3.3 0.001
CeoOwn(t−1)  0.0004 0.0002 1.86 0.062
Intercept 0.1173 0.2224 0.53 0.598
Panel C: total risk as a measure of ﬁrm risk to test for Hypotheses 2a and 2b
Equation Obs RMSE R2 2 P
qRoa 240 0.0806166 0.1755 50.6 0.0001
qReturn 240 1.616194 0.0991 31.04 0.0284
qlnComp int 240 0.6505914 0.5406 295.47 0.0000
Variables Coefﬁcient Std. error z P > z
qlnTotComp
Roa 1.0905 0.6349 1.72 0.086
Return 0.0927 0.0389 2.38 0.017
Roa*Risk  −0.3683 0.2398 −1.54 0.124
Return*Risk  −0.0149 0.0573 −0.26 0.794
Risk  0.0679 0.0380 1.79 0.074
lnSales 0.5844 0.0453 12.9 0.000
Age  −0.0002 0.0062 −0.03 0.979
CeoOwn(t−1)  0.0039 0.0006 6.08 0.000
Intercept 2.7171 0.6099 4.45 0.000
lnTotComp is the sum of cash compensation and equity-based compensation. Roa
is  return on assets (net income divided by total assets) and Return is the annual
stock return (difference between current year’s closing stock price and previous
year’s closing stock price, divided by the previous year’s closing stock price). Risk is
our measure of ﬁrm risk and derived by obtaining betas from 3-factor Fama–French
model using 30-day T-bill rates for risk-free rate of return. Roa*Risk is the interaction
term between roa and risk and Return*Risk is the interaction term between stock
return and risk. Roa, Return and Risk variables are mean centered (Aiken and West,
1991) to alleviate the multicollinearity. lnSales is the natural logarithm of sales. Age
represents CEO age at current year end. CeoOwn(t−1) is the CEO common stock
ownership in the previous year end and calculated as the number of stocks held
divided by total common shares outstanding in year t − 1.
Panel C of Table 7 illustrates ﬁndings for Hypotheses 2a and 2b
when we use total risk as the measure of ﬁrm risk. None of the
interaction terms in the Panel C of Table 7 are signiﬁcant implying
total risk does not moderate the relationship between pay and per-
formance for restaurant ﬁrms’ CEOs. This ﬁnding is consistent with
the main ﬁndings when the ﬁrm beta is utilized as the proxy of risk
(see Table 6).
6. Concluding remarks
Taking our motivation from the risk and compensation lit-
erature, we  investigated whether ﬁrm risk, operationalized as
ﬁrm’s systematic risk, affects CEO compensation contracting in
the US restaurant industry. Using a similar logic to that of
Sanders and Carpenter (1998), we  hypothesized that risk is a
source of organizational complexity and, therefore, increases both
the information-processing demands placed on top management
teams and difﬁculty of executive monitoring by boards. Thus,
board of directors have to take initiatives to handle the complexity
stemming from the ﬁrm risk companies encounter, and struc-
ture compensation contracts that are optimally designed to induce
executives to make optimum business decisions.
In our ﬁrst set of tests, we examined the structural change in
the CEO’s compensation with regard to level of ﬁrm risk he/she
has to deal with as the top executive of the company. We  speciﬁ-
cally argued that ﬁrms with higher systematic risk would be likely
to allocate a higher ratio of equity-based compensation to total
compensation as an incentive device as suggested by Sanders and
Carpenter (1998). Our ﬁndings suggest that board of directors of US
restaurant companies use equity-based compensation as an incen-
tive to motivate their CEOs due to increasing ﬁrm risk. This ﬁnding
further suggests that board of directors of restaurant companies
differentiates between a high-risk proﬁle and low-risk proﬁle com-
pany when structuring CEO pay package. This ﬁnding is in accord
with the expectation that in the presence of high ﬁrm risk, exec-
utives would have regarded a higher proportion of equity-based
compensation advantageous to their own wealth. Consequently,
they would strive to perform better to improve the ﬁnancial per-
formance of the ﬁrm, and so increase their own  wealth, which is tied
to performance of the ﬁrm. Especially in a high-risk industry such as
the restaurant industry, where the average compensation for senior
executives falls behind those of incumbents in larger industries,
this pay mechanism would motivate upper level managers to per-
form higher. Despite the restaurant industry’s overall strength in
the US economy, individual restaurant companies are considerably
smaller enterprises compared to larger services and manufactur-
ing ﬁrms. Smaller sizes could intuitively imply that there are not
yet advanced and well-accepted compensation mechanisms in the
restaurant industry. However, the observed relationship between
ﬁrm risk and proportion of equity-based compensation and also
the level of compensation as evidenced in the robustness anal-
yses is promising for further applications of more advanced pay
mechanisms in the restaurant industry.
Previous research has shown that boards reward their execu-
tives with large pay-checks for improved ﬁrm performance (Jensen
and Murphy, 1990; Mehran, 1995; McConnell and Servaes, 1990).
This has been regarded as a signiﬁcant motivational tool for com-
pensation committees to encourage manager to act in the best
interest of owners (Veliyath and Bishop, 1995). With the increas-
ing ﬁrm risk for a given company, executive may  be less inclined
to take on risky projects that are expected to increase shareholder
wealth. Besides, ﬁrm risk increases operational and ﬁnancial com-
plexity for managers to make optimum business decisions; and
achieving organizational and ﬁnancial benchmarks should be con-
siderably more signiﬁcant for riskier ﬁrms. With these arguments,
we anticipated that board of directors of the ﬁrms that are exposed
to higher ﬁrm risk assign signiﬁcantly higher pay premium on the
CEO’s compensation for the increased ﬁrm performance relative
to less risky ﬁrms. Our ﬁndings do not provide direct evidence
for this proposition when we  measure performance both as stock
returns and accounting returns. From a managerial point of view,
a manager/executive would be rewarded for his/her competence
to effectively manage high ﬁrm risk, and a proper reward system
on his/her compensation would increase his/her motivation for
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improved future performance. Lack of such compensation practices
in the restaurant industry must be of great concern for executives,
compensation committees, and board of directors.
Consistent with previous compensation studies, we  found ﬁrm
performance and size to be positively associated with both level and
structure of CEO compensation. Our results also indicate that CEO
previous stock ownership is positively related to his/her overall
compensation and percentage of equity-based compensation
7. Limitations and future research
We  acknowledge that our results are applicable only to the ﬁrms
similar to the restaurant companies included in our sample. Yet,
ﬁrms that operate in similar settings can beneﬁt from our ﬁnd-
ings for CEO compensation contracting. We  must also admit that
we work with a considerably smaller data set compared to studies
in mainstream accounting/ﬁnance literature. However, each of our
regressions has approximately 240 ﬁrm-year observations, which
we believe is enough to obtain reliable test results. Furthermore,
we suggest that a larger data set would produce more robust sta-
tistical analyses, yet we maintain that this data set includes all ﬁrm
years available from ExecuComp database. We  also note that our
results pertinent to ﬁrm risk are valid to the extent that we correctly
specify the ﬁrm risk. Econometrically, we use a 3-sls regression
approach to estimate our regression equations. For further inves-
tigations, researchers can look into more advanced econometric
techniques to handle the endogeneity problem occurring between
compensation and performance. We  propose that further research
may  investigate the association between risk and different compo-
nents of compensation. A further extension in this line of research
would be to ﬁnd hospitality industry-speciﬁc factors that can affect
the relationship between compensation and ﬁrm risk. Veliyath
et al. (1994) posit that because managerial operations are executed
according to ﬁrm strategy, an optimal incentive contract for exec-
utives is also likely to depend on ﬁrm strategy. Hence, our results
may  be of interest to policy makers for the ﬁrms in a way  that
together with a sufﬁcient bundle of ﬁrm’s strategy, ﬁrm’s com-
pensation policies can be better aligned. Finally, another area to
be explored in the analysis of the design of executive compensa-
tion and risk might be the inﬂuence of other forms of risk, such as
idiosyncratic, ﬁnancial, business, and actual compensation risk, on
CEO compensation in different segments of the hospitality indus-
try such as airline and retail sectors. Also, theorizing how asset
contraction policies such as stock splits, spinoffs, and dividend poli-
cies may  affect prospective CEO compensation contracts would be
recommended for further research.
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